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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 781

Accident time: 10:45

Accident Date: 20/01/2009

Where it occurred: AF/0112/0042, MF
0340, Shirin Village,
Surobi District, Kabul
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 17/02/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
protective equipment not worn (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 17th Feb 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 26 DMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Centre to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] DT- 26. The accident occurred at
10:45 hours on 20 January 2009 at minefield number AF/0112/0042/MF 0340, located in
Shirin village, Surobi district of Kabul province.
SUMMARY:
AF/0112/0042/MF 0340 is located alongside the Kabul-Jalalabad highway, near to Surobi
Power station. The area was mined during 1981-1989 by Russian troops and their successor
government in order to keep their convoys safe from the attacks of Mujahedeen during their
travelling from mentioned highway. This area was surveyed by LIS under the community No1201, SHA -02 and then was polygoned by LIAT during 2008. Several mine accidents
occurred in the area on human and animals during the past years.
[Demining group] DT-26 was tasked to start clearance operation on 21 December 2008.
During the period of operations they cleared 17490m2 area and found/destroyed 17 AP mines
and 738 different types of ERW.
On 20 January 2009 while de-miner [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane excavating
a detected signal, his bayonet stroked the top of a PMN mine and caused it to explode.
According to the investigation report the de-miner has not maintained and considered the
default clearance depth during the excavation and used his bayonet carelessly, therefore,
caused the accident. Unfortunately the victim was not fully dressed with PPE and his visor
was up during the accident. Thus he has got several injuries on his face, legs and different
parts of his body.
CONCLUSIONS:
The investigation team concluded that the contributing factors to this accident were: poor
command and control in the team and Carelessness of de-miner, as he has started operation
directly on the top of mine and not used his PPE properly.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Full PPE must be worn correctly at all times in a hazard area while the operation is
going on.

•

The de-miners should pinpoint the signal properly, mark the point and then to start
excavation according to the SOPs.

•

The de-miners should not hurry up during operations and be careful during
excavation drill and do not use the bayonet forcefully.

•

The command group should strengthen their supervision during operation and stop
the deminers from conducting drills in contrary to SOPs.

•

The team should undergo refresher training with focus on prodding and excavation
drill plus team command and control.
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•

The IPs are recommended to timely inform the AMACs of accident occurring and do
not disturb the accident area until arrival of internal and external investigation teams.

Victim Report
Victim number: 967

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES:severe Body; severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Legs
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "…injuries on his face, legs and different
parts of his body".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim
was working with his visor raised (and perhaps without frontal body protection) and was
excavating on top of the mine, but these errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is
listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators found that the group’s
management should “strengthen their supervision during operation”. Failure to provide
effective training is a further significant Management Control Inadequacy.
The investigators do not record whether the Victim suffered eye injury, but this is considered
highly likely and so is recorded.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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